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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the mandatory adoption of
IFRS/IAS and the information content of earnings in the European Union. More accurately, this
study aims to determine if the effect of IFRS adoption on the level of information asymmetry,
apprehended by the cost of capital and the financial analysts’ forecasts, is immediate or delayed.
Based on a longitudinal study, we find evidence that for the two first years of adoption,
international standards reduces significantly the cost of capital and the dispersion of the financial
analysts’ forecasts. Furthermore, the magnitude of this effect increases with increasing the
number of years after IFRS adoption. The findings further show that the effect of IFRS adoption
on financial analysts’ errors is not immediate and that the errors decrease from the third year
following the date of the first adoption.
Overall, the findings of this study highlight the importance of adopting IFRS in the reduction of
information asymmetry.
JEL Classification: M40, G34
Keywords: IFRS; information asymmetry; cost of capital; financial analysts’ forecasts;
immediate or delayed effect.
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Introduction

The large number of relationships between stakeholders, caused by outside openness of firms,
creates information asymmetry. To solve this problem, it is necessary to establish means of
control. One of these means is to improve information disclosure system, formulate the rules of
disclosure of information systems. Listed companies must be in accordance with the relevant
regulations, true, complete, accurate and timely disclosure of information, and consciously
accept the broad masse of investors and the general public oversight. In this case, financial
reporting can represent a source of reducing information asymmetry. Financial information
reliability and relevance depend on accounting principles used. Furthermore, for a better
comparability of results, it is necessary to provide a regulatory framework at the international
level for the publication of financial information in order to make the properly decision. This
framework generates a reduction of information asymmetry.
IFRS mandatory adoption is of great interest to managers and investors and its effect on the
informational content of accounting earnings is been much debated by academics in recent years.
The primary question discussed is whether information asymmetry was affected by the
application of international standards. Even if more and more countries adopt the International
Financial Reporting Standards, there is a continuing debate around the benefits of their
application on the information content of earnings taking into account the learning effect.
According to Philippe Danjou, Chief of Accountant business in the AMF (Financial Markets
Authority), the adoption of IFRS introduced a new estimation philosophy and upgrading
business performance. They have a considerable impact, in terms of quality and quantity of
information disclosed, on the financial reporting of companies and they change the meaning and
the significance of several indicators used by investors. In the same vein, Dicko and Khemakhem
(2010) stipulate that the IFRS adoption has certainly been a source of increasing of frequency
and number of published financial statements. But even if the superiority of IFRS relating to the
amount of information disclosed was undeniable, previous work has shown two divergent
reflections concerning the information disclosed quality. Some researchers have therefore
considered that IFRS improves the information content of accounting numbers because they lead
companies to disclose more and better information and limit discretionary accounting choices.
However, others consider that IFRS adoption is likely to reduce the information content of
accounting numbers because it limits the number of authorized accounting policies.
Indeed, the IFRS standards provide require high quality, transparent and comparable information
in financial statements and other reports to help investors in all global markets and other users to
make economic decisions (Epstein & Mirza, 1999). This postulate is in line with the main
objective of these new standards. To do this, IFRS are based on a new and important principle;
fair value instead of historical cost.
Fair value facilitates decision making of investors who are always in search of latest information
(Ball, 2006). According to this author, the market value because it synthesizes the latest
expectations of various economic agents, is incomparably more informative than historical cost.
This view is widely defended by Mistral, (2003) which states that the principle of fair value is
certainly more useful and appropriate to measure assets and liabilities as historical cost.
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This principle permits the provision of relevant information about financial instruments because
it allows the better reflection of company events and economic conditions in a timely way and
provides a good basis for the analysis and forecasting of future cash flows. According to the
IASB, it offers to users of the financial statements the ability to appreciate the consequences of
investment and funding strategies undertaken by a firm. Therefore, the principle of fair value
used in the preparation of financial statements is expected to increase the quality and the
relevance of the accounting numbers produced.
This study aims to analyze, for the first time, the global impact of IFRS on the information
content of earnings after its mandatory adoption in 2005 in the French context. Specifically, it
examines the impact of the international standards on the information asymmetry apprehended
by the cost of capital and the financial analyst’ forecasts proprieties (error and dispersion).
Secondly, this study examines whether the effect of IFRS adoption on information asymmetry is
immediate or delayed.
This research is one of the few empirical studies that analyze the impact of mandatory IFRS on
the information content of earnings through their impact on cost of capital and analysts' forecast
properties. The majority previous studies have researched the effect of IFRS on the quality of the
earnings by interesting on earnings management or on investor responsiveness to earnings
announcement.
The choice of French context can be explained by the various criticisms addressed to IFRS in the
French environment. The French General Accounting Plan constitutes a reference document that
shows the differences between IFRS and continental accounting systems. Ding et al. (2007)
show that France is one of the European countries where the accounting standards are most
different from IFRS and subsequently the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 has led to a
profound change in the Financial reporting. Furthermore, the study of French context enables us
to determine the effect of the adoption of IFRS and generalize the results to all companies of
Europe because the adoption of IFRS is mandatory for all companies listed in Europe from
January 2005.
This paper is organized as follow. The first part discusses the link between IFRS adoption and
the information content. The second part is a summary of previous literature and develops
hypotheses. The third part describes the research methodology adopted and the last part is
devoted to the presentation and analysis of results obtained.
Literature review and hypotheses development
IFRS and Earning information quality

European Union imposed the application of IFRS in all listed companies from January 2005 as a
result of unsuccessful attempts of harmonization. This decision is argued by the improvement of
the financial information quality for better decision making.
The results found by researchers studying the impact of IFRS on the financial information
quality are not similar. Several authors have confirmed the improvement of the explanatory
power of the accounting numbers following the IFRS adoption (Bartov et al., 2005; Jermakowicz
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et al., 2007; Barth et al., 2008; Iatridis, 2010; Landsman et al., 2012; and Salemah, 2013). This
result was attributed to the existence of additional information under IFRS. Escaffre and Sefsaf,
(2010) study the impact of additional informational relevance due to the adoption of IFRS in
2005 in several contexts. They test the relationship between stock returns and accounting
numbers (earnings and equity). The results indicate that the impact of adopting IFRS on the
informational relevance of accounting numbers is different from one country to another. These
authors concluded that the effect of adopting IFRS on the quality of accounting numbers depends
on institutional factors in each country, which is confirmed by Zogning, (2013).
Ahmed et al., (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of studies that verify the impact of adopting
IFRS on informational relevance and reported revenues transparency. Their result shows that the
informational relevance of equity did not increase after the adoption, while the informational
relevance of earnings generally increased when they valued using pricing models. The authors
controlled for factors such as legal origin, accounting system and auditing and the difference
between domestic GAAP and IFRS on the impact of IFRS and have not found any significant
effect.
In addition, many studies have shown a similarity in the informational relevance of accounting
data under IFRS and U.S. GAAP, (Meulen et al., 2007; Leuz, 2003; and Ahmed et al., 2010).
This result can be explained by the fact that IFRS are inspired mainly from American accounting
standard. Eccher and Healy, (2000) discuss the usefulness of the application of IFRS in the
People's Republic of China. They concluded that the information produced under IFRS is not
more useful than information prepared using Chinese standards. They attributed the IFRS failure
to the lack of effective control system in China, to monitor additional information produced
under international standards.
This study contributes to this literature with a different approach that attempts to verify the
impact of IFRS on the informational content of earnings through their impact on the information
asymmetry.
IFRS and cost of capital

According to the defendants of IFRS adoption, these standards constitute a source of information
asymmetry reduction. This reduction mitigates the risk perceived by investors, and consequently
the cost of capital. (Tweedie, 2006) stipulates that the elimination of a major investment risk, that
of the fear that the different national accounting systems are not fully understood, is expected to
reduce the cost of capital and open new opportunities for improvement of investment returns.
Cuijpers and Buijink, (2005) and Daske, (2006) find an insignificant relationship between the
voluntary adoption of IFRS and the cost of equity. This result is contrary to expectations of the
standards bodies, which stipulate that IFRS reduce the cost of equity. To explain this nonsignificant impact of the voluntary adoption of IFRS on the cost of equity, Daske et al., (2012)
examine the impact of voluntary and mandatory IFRS adoption on the liquidity and the cost of
capital. They make a comparison between companies applying full IFRS and those that apply a
few standards only. They show no change after the voluntary adoption of IFRS. However, the
mandatory adoption of full IFRS is followed by an increase in liquidity and a decrease in the cost
of capital which is not the case for partial adoption. They explained the insignificant effect of the
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voluntary IFRS adoption and partially adoption by the non-serious application of these standards.
The firms have not considered the IFRS adoption as a commitment to provide investors a higher
quality of financial information.
These results have been criticized by Kim et al., (2013) for two reasons. First, the differentiation
between companies adopting IFRS in full of partial adopters is not easy. Second, there is a
general tendency to improve the quality of reports which makes impossible to exclude the
possibility that companies applying local standards, improve the quality of their reports. These
authors examined the impact of the voluntary adoption of IFRS on the cost of capital and they
showed a significant effect independently of the country institutional factors.
Barth et al., (2008) find that the better quality of financial statements is associated with a lower
cost of capital. According to these authors, reducing the cost of equity is related to the voluntary
adoption of IFRS and not related to the mandatory adoption. Li, (2010), shows that the adoption
of the international standard reduces the cost of equity in companies that have a strong legal
enforcement. This adoption improves the comparability of information and increases the
disclosure level.To our knowledge, this is the only study that analyzed the impact of the
mandatory adoption of IFRS on the cost of capital in the European Union. However, the study
period ranging from 1995 to 2006, excluding the years 2004 and 2005 considered as a transition
period, is insufficient to give a clear and general idea of the IFRS impact. In other words, the
study period is limited to one year after the mandatory application of IFRS which may not be
sufficient to properly identify the effect of the IFRS mandatory adoption.
IFRS and analysts' forecast properties

IFRS, the accounting language adopted by listed companies since 2005, gives more transparent,
more rigorous and more detailed information. Therefore, it certainly had an impact on the
companies’ financial analysis.
Marchal et al., (2007) seek to determine the effect of adopting IFRS on financial analysis and
predict that these standards have made several methodological changes in the financial analysts
work. They find that the adoption of IFRS weakens comparability and makes the financial
analyst work more difficult.
Ashbaugh and Pincus, (2001) study the impact of differences between local standards and
international standards in terms of disclosure requirements and evaluation effects on the accuracy
of analysts' forecasts. The result show that more the local standards are converged with IFRS,
more the analysts' forecasts are accurate. So, they stipulate that the use of international standards
informs analysts about the company economic and financial situation better than the local
standards. This study is based on a sample of firms that have adopted the international standards
between 1990 and 1993 and during this period, firms could state that they adopt IFRS without
applying them entirety, which may affect the relevance of the results found. To resolve this
problem, Cuijpers and Buijink, (2005) focus only on the year 1999, from which firms are obliged
under IAS 1, to comply with all IFRS, to declare that they use these standards. They find that the
voluntary adoption of these standards leads to higher level of dispersion of financial analysts'
forecasts. On the contrary, Hodgdon et al., (2008) suggest that compliance with the disclosure
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requirements of IFRS reduces information asymmetry and strengthens the ability of analysts to
provide more accurate forecasts.
The impact of the IFRS mandatory adoption on analysts' forecasts has been also studied by (Jiao
et al., 2012) in the European context. The results show that the forecasts become more accurate
and less dispersed after the adoption of the new accounting standards. Jönsson et al., (2012),
with a sample of five countries (Sweden, Netherlands, France, Germany and the UK) show that
the mandatory adoption of IFRS has no significant effect on the accuracy of global forecasts of
financial analysts. However, by comparing the IFRS impact between countries, they show an
improvement in forecast accuracy in the UK, a country with local accounting standards more
similar to IFRS, and no decrease in error forecasting in countries with previous accounting
standards that differ from IFRS. They also show that, after adopting IFRS, the forecasts’
dispersion seems to decrease in most countries. Tan et al., (2011), by studying the impact of
IFRS in 25 countries, show that the quality of the financial analysts’ forecasts is improved only
for foreign analysts attracted by the adoption of these standards.
The heterogeneity of the results found by previous research shows that the question of the impact
of IFRS on cost of capital and financial analysts' forecasts requires more exploration. That is
why, this study examines the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on these two
measurement of information asymmetry over a period of 11 years from 2002 to 2012 in the
French context.
Hypotheses development

The main objective of accounting harmonization is to improve the relevance and the
comparability of information published. This improvement generates a reduction of information
asymmetry which results in a reduction of the risk perceived by investors. So, the first hypothesis
states that the IFRS adoption decreases the cost of capital.
H1: The cost of capital will decrease after the mandatory adoption of IFRS
Furthermore, financial analysts collect and analyze companies’ financial information to form
their opinions. So, the important source of information for them is the data from the financial
statements (Barker & Imam, 2008). The analyst’s outputs are informative to investors because
their publication leads to a market reaction that result in the observation of abnormal returns on
the publication day or on the following day (Frankel et al., 2006). Moreover, the financial
analyst is considered as a responsible of partial reduction of the asymmetry through his
publication. Furthermore and given the important role of financial analysts' forecasts in decisionmaking, these new standards are expected to improve forecasts of financial analysts. It is
predicted that the mandatory adoption of IFRS in Europe is positively associated with analysts'
earnings forecast accuracy. Therefore the second hypothesis is:
H2: The forecasts analysts’ accuracy will increase after the mandatory adoption of IFRS.
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Through earnings published after IFRS adoption, companies should provide to different users of
financial statements; especially the participants in the financial markets, the necessary
information that enable them to assess the value of the firm. According to (Lang & Lundholm,
1996), the adoption of IFRS will reduce the weight of private information as the result of the
improvement of the quality and quantity of public information which increased the consensus
among analysts. Therefore, it is supposed that the IFRS mandatory adoption in Europe is
negatively associated with the degree of disagreement among analysts. So, the third hypothesis
is:
H3: The dispersion of the analysts' forecasts will decrease after the mandatory adoption
of IFRS.
The application of IFRS, of Anglo-Saxon origin and that diverge widely from French standards
(continental system), normally requires a period of learning and understanding. This period may
differ from one company to another. It is related to the familiarity degree of the leaders and the
financial analysts to IFRS. Hence, the fourth hypothesis formulated is as follows:
H4: The effect of applying IFRS on information asymmetry will not be immediate.

Methodological Options Research
Model and variables of Research

To check the global impact of IFRS adoption on information asymmetry reduction, three models
are proposed. In the first model, the information asymmetry is apprehended by the cost of
capital. Then the model is the following:
COCt,i =β0 + β1 IFRS+ β2 Size t-1,i + β3 LEV t-1,i + β4 Loss t-1,i + β5 CSt,i+ ε

(1-1)

The properties of analysts' forecasts (error and dispersion) are used as a measure of information
asymmetry in the second and third models:
Error t,i(EPS) = β0 + β1IFRSt+ β2 Sizet-1,i + β3 LnNt-1,i + β4 Losst-1,i + β5SDepst-1,i + β6CSt,i+
ε
(2-1)
Dispersion t,i(EPS) = β0 + β1IFRSt+ β2 Sizet-1,i + β3 LnNt-1,i + β4 Losst-1,i + β5SDepst-1,i + β6
CSt,i+ ε
(3-1)
Three others models are estimated to test if the effect of IFRS adoption on the cost of capital,
error and dispersion of financial analysts’ forecasts requires some time or it is immediate. The
variable IFRS was replaced by two variables (IFRS1 and IFRS2) where the first one represents
the first two years that following the mandatory application, 2005 and 2006 and the second one
is related to the period beginning from the third year after the mandatory adoption.
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COCt,i =β0 + β1 IFRS1t + β2 IFRS2t + β3 Size t-1,i + β4 LEV t-1,i + β5 Loss t-1,i + β6 CSt,i+ ε(12)
Error t,i(EPS) = β0 + β1 IFRS1t + β2 IFRS2t + β3 Sizet-1,i + β4 LnNt-1,i + β5 Losst-1,i +
β6SDepst-1,i + β7CSt,i+ ε
(2-2)
Dispersion t,i(EPS) = β0 + β1 IFRS1t + β2 IFRS2t + β3 Sizet-1,i + β4 LnNt-1,i + β5 Losst-1,i + β6
SDepst-1,i + β7CSt,i+ ε
(3-2)
Table 1 summarizes the variables of the models.
Table 1
Definitions and measures of variables
Variables
COC

Definitions and measures
Capital cost of the company in year t

Error

Analyst forecasts’ error for year t.

Dispersion

Analyst forecasts’ dispersion for year t.

IFRS

IFRS is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 for years after 2005 and 0
otherwise.
IFRS1 is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 for years 2005 and 2006 and 0
otherwise.
IFRS2 is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 for years after 2006 and 0
otherwise.
Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of the total market
capitalization at the end of t-1.
Firm leverage measured by the ratio (net debt / EBITDA) to t-1

IFRS1
IFRS2
Size
LEV
LnN
Loss
SDeps
CS

Natural logarithm of the number of estimates in the final consensus forecast
for year t.
Loss takes the value 1 if the result for the year t is negative, 0 otherwise.
Standard deviation of the actual EPS of firm i over the four years preceding
the year t standardized to the stock price of the same firm in the same year.
CS is a dummy variable, which takes 1 for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 and
0 otherwise.

According to Urquiza et al., (2012), the measure of the capital cost is problematic in this current
literature. Thus, to calculate this cost, the formula of Easton, (2004), which is widely adopted by
previous studies (Li, 2010; Urquiza et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2013; and Nahar et al., 2016), was
used. These authors state that the measure proposed by (Easton, 2004) is a robust assessment of
specific cost of capital. This measure is based on the assumption of zero growth of abnormal
profits. It is based on earnings per share forecasts for two years in advance and the current price
combined as follows:
COC= 

(  )
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Where eps 2 and eps 1 refer to earnings per share forecast of 2 and 1 year in advance, P0 is the
current price and the COC is used to proxy the cost of capital.
To apply this formula, it is compulsory that the earnings forecast of the second year of a given
firm are higher than earnings forecast of this company in the first year later.
The forecasting error is the difference between the expected profit and profit released. So it is
expressed as following:
E(EPS)t= EPSit- π (EPSit)
With EPSit= The earnings per share of firm i on year t and π (EPSit) is the average forecast of
EPS for firm i in year t
The dispersion is calculated by the absolute value of the difference between the highest and the
lowest forecastings.
D (EPS)t = | forecast h, i, t-forecast l, i, t |
To allow comparability across firms, dispersion and error are normalized by the stock price of
the company at t-1.
To calculate these variables, earnings forecasts submitted in 180 days starting 15 days after the
beginning of the year is used. The choice of this period derives from the study’s aim which is
assessment of the informational content of earnings published by forecast EPS of year t. This
procedure ensures that when the analyst makes his prediction, he takes into account the
accounting information published.
The effect of IFRS adoption on information asymmetry may be affected by several control
variables. The size of the company for example has been introduced by several researchers to
explain the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Easton, 2004; Francis et al.,
2008; and Khotari et al., 2009). This variable is negatively related to the cost of capital and to the
error and dispersion of financial analysts' forecasts (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Jiao et al., 2012).
However, large firms are considered more transparent. They disclose more information about
their financial situations than small firms because disclosure policy gives them many benefits in
net terms (Welker, 1995; Lang & Lundholm, 1993) and because they may have access to more
information more easily than small firms (Barron et al., 1998). Therefore, the level of
information asymmetry will decrease for large companies. The negative relationship between
firm size and cost of capital is explained also by the fact that the risk of insolvency of large
companies is less than the smaller companies which confirms the reduction in the cost of capital
for large companies (Urquiza et al., 2012). Consequently, large companies are expected to have a
high level of disclosure which leads to less cost of capital, greater precision and less dispersion
in financial analysts’ forecasts. Similarly to prior studies (Ashbaugh & Pincus 2001; Jiao et al.,
2012), the firm size is defined as the natural log of a firm’s market capitalization at the end of
year t-1.
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According to Hail and Leuz, (2006), it is commonly accepted that leverage has an effect on the
cost of capital. Moreover, many researchers find that this leverage measured by the ability of the
company to repay its debts, affects positively the cost of capital (Gebhardt et al., 2001; Easton,
2004; Francis et al., 2008; and Li, 2010). Indeed, firms with high leverage have more risk of
insolvency which increases their cost of capital.
The number of analysts is another variable that may have an impact on the forecasts quality
(Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Lys & Soo, 1995; Byard et al., 2011; and Jiao et al., 2012). It is
determined by the number of analysts following the company and providing earnings forecast
(Lang & Lundholm, 1996). This variable is positively associated with forecast accuracy and
negatively associated with the dispersion of financial analysts' forecasts. (Lys & Soo, 1995)
argue that there is more competition among analysts when the number of analysts increases.
These will be more incentive to forecast accurately. So, the firms followed by a high number of
financial analysts will have more accurate forecasts and a higher level of forecasts’ dispersion.
Because financial analysts are subject to conflicting interests and firms in difficulty tend to
disclose little information to conceal its difficulties, analysts anticipate imperfectly losses
(Maghraoui & Dumontier, 2008). Forecast error and dispersion tend to be higher when the
announced EPS is negative or significantly decrease. Financial distress is approached through the
variable Loss. It is a binary variable which designed whether the result of the year t is negative.
This variable is expected to be positively associated with the error, dispersion and cost of capital.
In fact, financial analysts are optimistic agents that tend to underestimate profit falls and losses.
Indeed, Coën and Desfleurs, (2010) confirm that it is easier for analysts to forecast profits as
losses and increases profits rather than decreases. The results of these authors suggest that the
"type and variation of profit expected" is by far the effect that best explains the accuracy and
dispersion of forecasts.
SDeps represents the standard deviation of EPS for firm i calculated over the four years
preceding the year relative to estimated EPS (Maghraoui & Dumontier, 2008). It is standardized
by the stock price of the company concerned in t and it aims to assess the difficulty of
forecasting. The dispersion and the error increase with the increasing of this value (Lang &
Landholm, 1996). In fact the more that the benefits of the firm are fluctuating, the less
forecasting profits is easy.
The last control variable is the financial crisis which has begun in 2007. This crisis, in the
beginning banking and located in the American mortgage market, quickly became global and
financial. It has led to difficulties in investment and to a heightened uncertainty in financial
markets because investors are more risk averse when selecting projects and markets. So, it
creates severe problems of asymmetric information, makes the collect of the necessary
information more difficult which increases the difficulty of the work of the financial analysts.
That is why, it is expected that crisis is positively associated with the cost of capital, the error
and the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. The effects of this crisis persist until now but the main
effects can be limited to the three years 2008, 2009 and 2010.
The impact of IFRS on cost of capital and financial analysts' forecasts is tested using a panel data
model and the regression is performed using STATA.
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Sample and Data
To conduct this empirical study, the sample consists of all listed French companies in the CAC
All Tradable Index. This index has replaced SBF 250 since 21 March 2011 and is the largest of
the Paris Bourse. It represents the entire French economy and can indicate the overall evolution
of the French equity market. According to Cormier et al., (2010), this index reflects the diversity
of the implementation of IFRS and it is the best type of sample that can draw conclusions on the
application of international standards.
The examination of the impact of IFRS, taking as sample one country, aims to eliminate any
biases associated with the use of international samples and to avoid the effect of differences in
institutional environments before adopting IFRS.
Firms in financial sectors identified by Global Industry Classification Standard, such as
insurance companies, credit agencies and banks are excluded. This treatment is justified by the
specific accounting and financial characteristics of these organisms that might bias the results
(Urquiza et al., 2012).
This study spreads over 11 years from 2002 to 2012, while eliminating the transition year.
Several researchers consider the transition year, the first year of mandatory adoption of IFRS
2005 (Jones & Finley, 2010; Jiao et al., 2012). Others consider the year of transition the year
prior to the year of the mandatory adoption of IFRS 2004 (Saadi, 2010). The third line of
research has considered the two years 2004 and 2005 as transition years (Li, 2010). According to
Saadi, (2010), managers are more likely to manage their results during the year preceding the
year of the mandatory adoption of IFRS to avoid large fluctuations in results and to keep them
within a certain range at the time of mandatory adoption. The year 2004 was a year of
comparative financial statements where many companies had practiced a double set of books.
Indeed, the presence of two repositories on the same financial markets during the same period
may bias the results. Based on this postulate, the year 2004 considered as a transition year is
excluded.
The choice of long term study involves several interests. On one hand, the analysis of 10 years
allows us to take into account changes in standards (from PCG to IFRS) and to stand back from
each accounting standards (two PCG-year and eight-year IFRS). On the other hand, this choice
allows us to limit the change period of Standards bias (2004).
The observations for which data are missing or which are extreme are eliminated. Subsequently,
our final sample for the first model consists of 355 observations, for the second model consists of
620 observations and for the third model consists of 470 observations.
To collect data, the market data has been taken from the database Datastream, data from
financial analysts' forecasts from I / B / E / S data and annual reports from Worldscope data.
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Empirical Tests and results
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive Statistics of numeric variables are presented in table 2, 3 and 4.
For dispersion, the observation characterized by a single financial analyst is eliminated. To test
the dispersion of financial analysts' forecasts, the firm must be necessarily followed by at least
two analysts. In both sample (forecast error and dispersion) analyst coverage ranges from 1 (2 for
dispersion) to 16.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of the cost of capital
Variable

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

COC

0.439

0.519

0

3.640

8565.873

17678.8

35.91

135980.6

3.037

14.534

0

390

Log MC
LEV

Table 3
Descriptive statistics of the forecast error and dispersion
Variable

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

Error

-0.436

1.312

-19.881

3.587

Dispersion

0.514

0.800

0

8.396

8565.873

17678.8

35.91

135980.6

N

3.197

2.334

1

16

N*

4.050

2.227

2

16

SDeps
0.060
0.089
N*: The number of analyst forecast for the dispersion model

0

1.019

MktCap

Table 4 shows clearly the change of the cost of capital. The average of this variable is 0.423 in
the post-adoption period, which is lower than the average value in the pre adoption period
(0.511), so a decrease of 0.088. The absolute average value of forecast errors after the adoption
of IFRS (0.412) is lower than the absolute average value of forecast errors before IRFS adoption
(0.520), a drop of (0.108) and this trend is also confirmed with the dispersion of the financial
analysts forecasts (drop is 0.5). These results are similar to those of Jiao et al., (2012).
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics pre and post IFRS adoption
Variable

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

Cost of capital pre IFRS adoption

0.511

0.517

0

2.102

Cost of capital post IFRS adoption

0.423

0.519

0

3.640

Cost of capital

ForecastError
Forecast Error pre IFRS adoption

-0.520

0.593

-3.918

0.394

Forecast Error post IFRS adoption

-0.412

1.473

-19.881

3.587

Dispersion pre IFRS adoption

0.874

1.047

0

8.396

Dispersion post IFRS adoption

0.387

0.647

0

4.955

Dispersion

Table 5 presents simple correlations between the different variables of the first model. The
dependent variable COC is positively and significantly correlated with variables loss and
financial crisis at the 1%. This can be explained by the uncertainty resulting from the financial
crisis and the high level of risk that generates.

Table 5
Correlation matrix
COC

IFRS

Log MC

COC

1.0000

IFRS

-0.0465

1.0000

Size

-0.0729

0.0486

1.0000

LEV

Loss

LEV

0.0591

0.0765

-0.0054

1.0000

Loss

0.1802***

-0.2113***

0.0185

0.1535**

1.0000

CS

0.2306***

0.3226***

0.0686

-0.0402

-0.0318

CS

1.0000

***Significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 15%, *significant at the 10%

Table 6 and 7 present the simple correlation between variables of the second and the third
models. Error is negatively associated with IFRS, positively associated with size, negatively
associated with analyst coverage in accordance with the results of (Jiao et al., 2012) and
positively associated with crisis. Furthermore, dispersion is negatively associated with IFRS, size
and crisis and positively associated with analyst coverage, loss and standard deviation of EPS.
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Table 6
Correlation matrix of the forecast error
Error

IFRS

LnMktCap

LnN

Loss

SDeps

Error

1.0000

IFRS

-0.0275***

1.0000

Size

0.1967***

0.1036**

1.0000

LnN

-0.00889***

-0.3014***

0.4848***

1.0000

Loss

-0.0080

-0.1730***

-0.0294

-0.0917**

1.0000

SDeps

0.0332

0.0001

0.0027

-0.0433

0.2540***

1.0000

CS

0.1038***

0.3402***

0.0854**

-0.1481***

-0.0088

-0.0227*

CS

1.0000

*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.

Table 7
Correlation matrix of the forecast dispersion
Dispersion

IFRS

LnMktCap

LnN

Loss

SDeps

Dispersion

1.0000

IFRS

-0.2267***

1.0000

Size

-0.2971***

0.190***

1.0000

LnN

0.0847***

-0.346***

0.343***

1.0000

Loss

0.0958***

-0.154***

-0.007

-0.085*

1.0000

SDeps

0.1145***

0.042

-0.019

-0.050

0.201***

1.0000

CS

-0.0944*

0.353***

0.154***

-0.165***

-0.065

0.088*

CS

1.0000

*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.

Empirical Results
Given that his study is based on a sample of panel data, it is necessary to verify the specification
of a homogeneous or heterogeneous of data. The Hausman specification test is used to
discriminate between fixed and random effects.
Table 8
Hausman test results and the explanatory power of the models
F

Prob>F

R2

0.0346

9.87

0.0000

15.60%

0.0000

14.17

0.0000

13.87%

34.80

0.0000

24.95

0.0000

28%

1-2

8.24

0.1436

56.56

0.0000

14.95%

2-2

59.94

0.0000

11.83

0.0000

13.58%

3-2

36.96

0.0000

27.87

0.0000

33.69%

Models

Chi 2

Prob> Chi 2

1-1

12.01

2-1

62.15

3-1
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The results found from the Hausman test lead us to retain the fixed-effect model to the models 11, 2-1, 3-1, 2-2 and 3-2 and the random effect model to the model 1-2. The results confirm the
good quality of models at a significance level of less than 1%. So, all the models used are
statistically significant and explain the phenomenon.
Table 9, 10 and 11 present the regressions results.
IFRS and cost of capital
Statistical tests highlight the negative impact of adopting IFRS on the cost of capital. Indeed, the
examination of causal relationships shows that the coefficient associated with the link between
the adoption of IFRS and the capital cost is negative (-0.142) and statistically significant (P
value> is 0.030). These results show that the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 leads to a
significant reduction in the cost of capital.
The capital cost was used in this study as a measure of the level of information asymmetry of a
given company. However, the reduction of this cost reflects a reduction in information
asymmetry. This result highlights the informational contribution of the adoption of this new
international standard which permits to conclude that the IFRS mandatory adoption improves the
information content of accounting earnings.
The results of model 1-2 as shown in table 9, point that the effect of the IFRS mandatory
adoption on the company’s capital cost is immediate. The association between IFRS and cost of
capital is significant from the two first years of application. These results supply some evidence
that for the two first years of adoption, international standards reduce significantly the cost of
capital but the magnitude of this reduction increases with increasing the number of years after
IFRS adoption. The significance of these results may be explained by the fact that French listed
companies begin to apply international standards before 2005, date of the mandatory adoption.
In addition, and in line with our expectations and previous results (Li, 2010; Paugam et al.,
2013), there is a negative association between firm size and the capital cost. This association can
be explained by the fact that large companies are encouraged to disclose more information to the
public than the smaller. Moreover, large companies are considered more transparent and this
transparency represents a source of information asymmetry reduction and therefore of cost of
capital reduction.
Loss and financial crisis are control variables that also have a significant effect on the cost of
capital.The positive association between these two explanatory variables and the cost of capital is
related to their effects on the level of investor confidence to the company. In other words, the
investor has less confidence in loss making company and more uncertainty to any investment in
times of crisis.Several authors state that the significant impact of the crisis on the financial
situation of listed companies is largely related to the adoption of international standards and
particularly the fair value principle applied within these standards. Obert, (2008) provides that
IFRS are not responsible for the financial crisis, but they have undoubtedly exacerbated it
following the use of fair value as the measurement basis. This was invalidated by the IFRS
defendants as Danjou and Gelard, (2008), who stipulate that these standards have helped to
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anticipate the behavior investors and eliminate sudden volatilities in crisis. In fact, the
application of IFRS considered as a factor accentuating the financial crisis remains a subject of
ongoing debate between the defendants and the opponents of IFRS.
Table 9
Regression results of the cost of capital
Model 1-1

Z

P>||

IFRS1

-0.322

-2.83

0.005***

IFRS2

-0.363

-3.74

0.000***

0.008***

-0.092

-2.18

0.029**

Coef

Z

IFRS

-0.142

-2.19

P>||

Model 1-2
Coef

Variables

0.030**

Size

-0.303

-2.66

LEV

-0.004

-1.42

0.157

-0.001

-0.02

0.984

Loss

0.161

1.86

0.064*

0.182

2.30

0.021**

Crisis

0.330

6.02

0.000***

0.321

5.90

0.000***

Constant

1.460

3.81

0.000***

0.971

5.69

0.000***

R-sq = 15.60%
R-sq = 14.95%
F=9.87, Prob>F=0.0000
Wald Chi2 = 56.56, Prob>Chi2 =0.0000
***Significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 15%, *significant at the 10%

IFRS and analyst proprieties
The analysis of the IFRS mandatory adoption on the financial analysts' forecasts shows that
IFRS adoption is negatively associated with the properties of analysts' forecasts namely error and
dispersion. For the overall effect of the IFRS adoption, the examination of causal relations shows
that the coefficient associated with the link between the adoption of IFRS and the error of
analysts’ forecasts is negative (-0.347) and statistically significant (P value> is 0.009). In
addition, the results show that the coefficient associated with the link between the adoption of
IFRS and the dispersion of analysts' forecasts is negative (-1.268) and statistically significant
(0.017). These results show that the IFRS mandatory adoption produces an improvement in the
quality of financial analysts' forecasts. Indeed, the forecasts are more accurate and less dispersed
after the adoption of IFRS.
Financial analysts' forecasts were used in this study as a measure of information asymmetry level
of a given company. However, the reduction in error and forecast dispersion reflects a reduction
in information asymmetry. This result confirms the previous findings at cost capital level and
highlights the informational contribution of the adoption of this new international standard which
allows concluding that the mandatory adoption of IFRS represents a source of improving the
information content of accounting earnings.
To examine whether the effect of IFRS mandatory adoption on the forecast’s properties is
deferred or immediate, we test models 2.2 and 2.3. Table 10 shows that the reduction of the error
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is significant from the third year of adoption, (ie from 2007). However, the reduction of the
dispersion is immediate and significant from the first year of application.
These results illustrate that the reduction of forecasting error following the application of IFRS is
delayed. This reduction, resulting from the IFRS adoption, cannot be imputed only to the period
of learning and comprehension required under these standards. In fact, the decrease of error is
linked to the publication of the accounting numbers produced under the international standards.
Yet, the first publication of the results in accordance to IFRS is in the end of 2005.
Consequently, the error decrease can take place only from the year 2006.
The forecast error is significantly and positively associated with firm size, the standard deviation
of EPS and negatively associated with the number of financial analysts. In addition, the forecast
dispersion is significantly and positively associated with the number of financial analysts who
follow the company and the loss and negatively associated with the size of the company.
The positive association found between the error and the size of the company is opposite to result
found by (Jiao et al., 2012)and to our expectations and similar to the results of Maghraoui and
Dumontier, (2008). According to these latter authors, this result can be explained by the complex
assets and activities of large companies. On the contrary, the size is negatively associated to the
forecast dispersion which can be explained by the higher possibility of large companies to access
to further information.
The standard deviation of EPS is a measure of the results instability which represents a source of
forecast difficulties. So, the increase of instability generates a higher level of error.
In accordance with previous findings (Lys & Soo, 1995; Jiao et al., 2012), forecast error is
negatively correlated with analyst coverage which is explained by the competition among the
analysts. When the number of analysts following the company is higher, each analyst aims to
forecast more accurately than the others and consequently the forecast error decreases and the
forecast dispersion increases. It is confirmed also, by the results obtained that the losses increase
the forecast dispersion.
The non-significant effect of the crisis on error and dispersion of financial analysts' forecasts can
be explained by the analyst’s reaction to this critical period. Faced with the risk of committing
significant forecast errors, the analysts are forced to intensify their research. According to
Levasseur and Romon, (2011), financial analysts, in times of crisis, mostly follow market
movements to eliminate any estimates errors.
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Table 10
Regression results of the forecast error
Model 2-1

Model 2-2

Variables

Coef

Z

P>||

IFRS

-0.347

-2.61

0.009***

P>||

Coef

Z

IFRS1

-0.076

-0.40

0.687

IFRS2

-0.343

-2.03

0.043**

Size

2.092

8.15

0.000***

2.038

7.99

0.000***

LnN

-0.526

-2.42

0.016**

-0.532

-2.35

0.019**

Loss

0.145

0.82

0.415

0.162

0.91

0.361

SDeps

3.129

3.84

0.000***

3.127

3.81

0.000***

CS

0.158

1.42

0.157

0.141

1.27

0.205

Cons

-7.426

-8.39

0.000***

-7.322

-8.13

0.000***

R-sq = 13.87%
R-sq = 13.58%
F=14.17, Prob>F=0.0000
F=11.83, Prob>F=0.0000
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.

Table 11
Regression results of the forecast dispersion
Model 3-1

Model 3-2

Variables

Coef

Z

P>||

Coef

Z

P>||

IFRS

-1.268

-2.39

0.017**

IFRS1

-0.485

-5.29

0.000***

IFRS2

-0.449

-5.11

0.000***

Size

-1.464

-9.97

0.000***

-1.390

-9.93

0.000***

LnN

7.604

4.76

0.000***

0.541

3.41

0.001***

Loss

0.225

2.00

0.046**

0.195

1.82

0.070*

SDeps

-0.083

-1.14

0.253

-1.316

-1.56

0.111

CS

0.0531

0.80

0.423

0.057

0.91

0.362

Cons

5.605

10.34

0.000***

5.794

11.13

0.000***

R-sq = 28%
R-sq = 33.69%
F=24.95, Prob>F=0.0000
F=27.87, Prob>F=0.0000
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Conclusion
This study focuses on a major objective of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in Europe since
2005, which is the improving of the relevance of accounting earnings. To answer the research
question, this study tried to determine the impact of these standards on the information content
reflected by their impact on information asymmetry. For this purpose, the cost of capital and the
financial analysts' forecasts were used as proxies of information asymmetry. The sample is
comprised of all of the CAC all tradable for the period 2002-2012.
The results highlight the improvement of the information content of earnings after the IFRS
mandatory adoption, reflected by a reduction of cost of capital and error and dispersion of
financial analysts' forecasts. Furthermore, this impact is immediate for the reduction of the cost
of capital and the dispersion of financial analysts’ forecasts. However, it is delayed for the
reduction of error of financial analysts’ forecasts. The latter result is mainly attributed to the
publication date of results under IFRS. The financial statements prepared under these standards
are produced after one year of adoption (2006) and not from the date of adoption.
The originality of this study consists, first, in analyzing the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption
on the information content of earnings by using the two measures of information asymmetry,
cost of capital and analysts' forecast properties and second, in taking a long analysis period from
2002 to 2012 as a period of study. This eliminates all bias related to the learning of these
standards and to crisis.
The results provide evidence relevant to the continue debate about the benefits of international
accounting harmonization. So, even if the adoption of IFRS is mandatory diced 2005 for all
listed European companies, the impact of these standards may be dependent on the specific
institutional factors in each country. This study can be enriched by the inclusion of several
European countries to clearly identify the impact of institutional environments.
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